The Handala Hack Team recently made major news with their attack on medical device manufacturer Stryker.
First observed in late 2023, Handala is a pro-Palestinian hacktivist group that targets Israeli government, critical infrastructure and organizations perceived as aligned with Israel.
While they present themselves as an independent collective, analysts have identified probable links to Iranian cyber operations. What makes them particularly notable is their combination of destructive attacks, data theft and psychological messaging — a hybrid approach designed for both operational damage and media impact.
The Stryker incident, which unfolded on March 11, 2026, is a case in point. The attack wiped thousands of employee devices, locked workers out of systems and disrupted manufacturing operations globally.
With this in mind, we've put together a detailed threat brief covering Handala's known tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), indicators of compromise (IOCs) and defensive recommendations to help security teams assess their exposure and strengthen their defenses.
Read the full Handala Hack Team Threat Brief below.
Handala Hack Team is a pro-Palestinian hacktivist group that emerged publicly in December 2023. The group conducts politically motivated cyber operations primarily targeting Israeli government, critical infrastructure, technology companies, and organizations perceived as supporting Israel.
Although the group presents itself as an independent hacktivist collective, multiple analysts believe it may have links to or alignment with Iranian cyber operations, potentially operating as a proxy or influence group.
Handala operations combine hacktivism, cyber-espionage, and information operations, including data leaks and psychological messaging designed to create political impact.
| First Observed | 2023 |
| Motivation | Ideological / political (anti-Israel, pro-Palestinian narrative) |
| Capability | Moderate (increasing sophistication) |
| Intent | High (ideologically motivated) |
| Operational Style | Hybrid hacktivism + destructive cyber operations |
On March 11, 2026, news reports indicated that medical device manufacturer Stryker experienced a large-scale cyberattack that disrupted its global IT environment. The attack caused outages across company systems and impacted employees and operations worldwide. Handala claimed responsibility for the operation via social media and Telegram channels. Employee posts on Reddit also appeared to confirm the disruption.
| Impact Area | Details |
|---|---|
| Global IT Outage | Company systems and services disrupted worldwide |
| Endpoint Wipes | Thousands of employee devices wiped, including Windows laptops and phones connected through Microsoft Intune |
| Access Loss | Employees locked out of systems, email, and internal applications |
| Operational Disruption | Manufacturing and office operations affected, including major facilities such as Cork, Ireland |
| Workforce Impact | Thousands of workers reportedly sent home due to outages |
Reports suggest the attack began shortly after midnight U.S. Eastern time.
| Characteristic | Observed Activity |
|---|---|
| Destructive Behavior | Wiper-style activity rather than ransomware |
| Endpoint Impact | Data erased from endpoints using Microsoft Intune |
| Mobile Impact | Cell phones with Intune client wiped |
| Defacement | Login page defacement with Handala logo |
| Messaging | Propaganda-style message displayed after wipe |
This pattern aligns with destructive hacktivist or state-aligned influence operations, not financially motivated attacks.
Handala claimed the operation included large-scale data exfiltration, stating they obtained 50 TB of data and wiped hundreds of thousands of systems. These claims have not been independently verified.
| Malware / Tool | Description |
|---|---|
| Hamsa Wiper | Destructive malware used in the “Operation HamsaUpdate” campaign targeting Israeli infrastructure |
| Hatef Wiper | Custom wiper used in destructive attacks against targeted systems |
| Handala Malware / Loader | Multi-stage loader chain using Delphi-based loader and AutoIT injector to deploy destructive payloads |
| Category | Indicator |
|---|---|
| Network / Account Activity | Large volumes of Telegram login attempts or session hijacking |
| Network / Account Activity | SIM swap or unusual telecom events preceding account compromise |
| Network / Account Activity | Abnormal Telegram API enumeration activity for C2 |
| Network / Account Activity | Large data exfiltration followed by leak site publication |
| System Activity | Execution of AutoIT-based loaders |
| System Activity | Suspicious Delphi binaries executing staged payloads |
| System Activity | Disk-wipe behavior shortly after compromise |
| System Activity | Use of remote management tools such as NetBird |
| Operational Indicators | Threat actor messaging referencing “Handala,” “HamsaUpdate,” or anti-Israel propaganda statements |
Publicly documented hard IOCs are limited, which is common with hacktivist groups. Indicators below should be evaluated in context, especially medium-likelihood items.
| IOC | Description | Likelihood |
|---|---|---|
| link-target[.]net/jfby32 | Example lure / delivery URL seen in campaign | Medium |
| www[.]icanhazip[.]com | IP identification site | Medium |
| mega[.]nz / mega[.]io | Mega used to host malicious .msi installers | High |
| 64.176.172.0/24 | Reported CIDR associated with campaign infrastructure | Medium |
| storjshare[.]io/ | Storj-hosted payload used to deliver installer / payload | High |
| 169.150.227.0/24 | VPN service | Medium |
| 64.176.172.101 | Reported recurring cluster / staging IP | Medium |
| 64.176.172.165 | Reported recurring cluster / staging IP | Medium |
| 64.176.169.22 | Reported recurring cluster / staging IP (Void Manticore lineage) | Medium |
| 64.176.172.235 | Reported recurring cluster / staging IP | Medium |
| 64.176.173.77 | Reported recurring cluster / staging IP | Medium |
| 146.185.219.235 | VPN service | Medium |
| IOC | Description | Likelihood |
|---|---|---|
| Careol.zip / Carrol.zip | Archive names observed in campaign; OCR / spelling variants | Medium |
| Carrol.cmd | Script artifact observed in delivery / execution chain | Medium |
| Champion.pif | Payload filename observed in campaign artifacts | Medium |
| cl.exe | Wiper binary (destructive executable) | High |
| ClientBin.aspx | ASPX web shell | Medium |
| CrowdStrike.exe | Fake “fix” executable name used as lure / payload | Medium |
| do.zip / Do.exe | Delivery / artifact name tied to destructive stage | Medium |
| error4.aspx | ASPX web shell | Medium |
| error4.aspx / ClientBin.aspx / pickers.aspx | ASPX webroot filenames matching observed webshells | High |
| GoXML.exe | Wiper-family executable observed in destructive incidents | High |
| mellona.exe / disable_defender.exe | Tools / filenames used for AV or defense disabling | Medium |
| OpenFileFinder.dll | DLL observed in payload chains (data access / exfil stage) | Medium |
| Phase3.ps1 | PowerShell stage observed in wiper chains | Medium |
| Pickers.aspx | ASPX web shell | Medium |
| RawDisk3 | Service label used to run raw disk / destructive driver | High |
| reGeorge | Webshell family used for web-tier persistence and lateral pivot | High |
| rwdsk.sys | Raw disk / driver artifact used by destructive tooling | High |
| Ukraine | Wiper-stage artifact name appearing in reporting | Medium |
| Artifact | Hash |
|---|---|
| cl.exe | e1204ebbd8f15dbf5f2e41dddc5337e3182fc4daf75b05acc948b8b965480ca0 |
| GoXML.exe | bbe983dba3bf319621b447618548b740 |
| Handala PowerShell Wiper | 3cb9dea916432ffb8784ac36d1f2d3cd |
| Handala Wiper (handala.exe) | 5986ab04dd6b3d259935249741d3eff2 |
| malicious .msi (CRM-linked installer) | 6eb7dbf27a25639c7f11c05fd88ea2a301e0ca93d3c3bdee1eb5917fc60a56ff |
| NetBird Installation File | 3dfb151d082df7937b01e2bb6030fe4a |
| Rwdsk.sys | 3c9dc8ada56adf9cebfc501a2d3946680dcb0534a137e2e27a7fcb5994cd9de6 |
Additional Note: Additional hashes have been released and tied to the threat actor without full context. Independent validation has not been performed. Use those values with caution.
| Command / IOC | Description | Likelihood |
|---|---|---|
vssadmin Delete Shadows /all /quiet | Shadow copy deletion command used pre/post-wipe | High |
bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled No | Boot recovery disabled via bcdedit (anti-recovery) | High |
bcdedit /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures | Boot policy changed to hinder recovery | High |
Wiper arg: confirmdeletefiles | Wiper invocation argument observed in destructive chain | High |
ping 4.2.2.4 -n 5 > Nul | Ping timing / flow-control pattern used inside scripts | Medium |